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Non–technical Summary
Standard job search theory implies that longer entitlement periods for unemployment benefits
increase the expected duration of unemployment spells until individuals accept a new job. This
paper empirically analyzes the distribution of unemployment durations in West-Germany before
and after the reforms of unemployment benefits during the mid 1980s. These reforms extended the
maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits up to 32 months for elderly unemployed.
The paper uses the comprehensive IAB employment subsample. Since unemployment is not
directly observed in the data, we introduce two proxies: nonemployment (NE) and unemployment
between jobs (UBJ). The analysis develops a theoretical framework in order to interpret differences
between nonemployment and unemployment between jobs.
The empirical analysis shows that the effect of the reforms depend heavily on the definition of
unemployment. In particular, we find that the risk of entering NE increased for the elderly after
the reform whereas the risk of entering UBJ remained basically constant. Also the average NE
duration for those individuals who were older than 53 years increased by 50% after the reform,
whereas the average NE duration decreased by 25% for those individuals who were younger than
42 years. Interestingly, the ratio of the average UBJ durations between these groups remained
constant. Surprisingly, we observe that the estimated survival functions (the survival function
as a function of duration T provides the share of those who are still unemployed after time T
among those who started out as unemployed) for remaining in UBJ did not change in response
to the reform. We only observe an increase for the mid 1990s recession which is also the case for
the younger unemployed. At the same time, the survival functions for remaining in NE increased
dramatically, in particular for the elderly.
We provide a theoretical framework that explains our findings and we conduct a simulation
study of the model which matches our empirical findings. We conclude that the NE duration for
the elderly increased due to an increase in early retirement, whereas the duration did not increase
among those who were still looking for a new job.
Our empirical results suggest that the common result of job search theory and the related
empirical literature, longer entitlement periods for unemployment benefits increase the time until
the unemployed accepts a new job, is not supported. Moreover, we do not observe that with longer
entitlement periods for unemployment benefits individuals, who find a job, actually end up in more
stable jobs or obtain higher earnings. We conclude that the additional expenses by the German
federal labor office for the longer entitlement periods yield an advantage for two groups: companies,
who disband their elderly employees using subsidized early retirement packages and the elderly
unemployed who lost the incentive to look for a new job using the extensive early retirement
packages. Since the elderly employees did approve of such generous retirement packages, they
didn’t insist on their dismissal protection. This is a typical win–win situation on the expense of
the general public.
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Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes the distribution of unemployment durations in West-
Germany before and after the changes during the mid 1980s in the maximum entitlement
periods for unemployment benefits for elderly unemployed. The analysis is based on the
comprehensive IAB employment subsample containing register panel data for about 500.000
individuals in West Germany. We introduce two proxies for unemployment, since the data
do not involve a precise economic definition of unemployment. We provide a theoretical anal-
ysis of the link between the durations of nonemployment and of unemployment durations
between jobs. In our empirical analysis we find significant changes in the distributions of
nonemployment durations for older unemployed individuals. At the same time, the distribu-
tion of unemployment durations between jobs did not change in response to the reforms. Our
findings are consistent with an interpretation that many firms and workers used the more
beneficial laws as a part of early retirement packages but those workers who were still look-
ing for a job did not reduce their search effort in response to the extension of the maximum
entitlement periods. This interpretation is consistent with a simulation of our theoretical
model under economically plausible assumptions.
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1 Introduction
Standard job search theory implies that longer entitlement periods for unemployment benefits
increase the expected duration of unemployment spells until individuals accept a new job (see
Katz and Meyer, 1990, for a survey). A number of institutional changes in the West German
unemployment compensation system were enacted between 1985 and 1987.1 The probably most
important change was the extension of the maximum entitlement period for unemployment benefits
in the case of elderly unemployed (table 1). The transition was stepwise over the years 1985-1987
for the different age groups. Since the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment spells
starting in 1984 or later was also ex-post extended, it is expected to find smoother transitions in
the data and not a single jump. The unemployment durations started in 1983 were the last to
which only the old law applied. The analysis here is about the effects on unemployment durations
due to these reforms. The paper is highly policy relevant since a reduction in benefit entitlement
periods is currently implemented by policy makers in Germany to effectively undo most of the
institutional changes in the 1980s in an effort to reduce the level of unemployment in Germany.
A number of studies have already pursued an empirical analysis of unemployment duration
before and after the reform under consideration (Hunt, 1995, Hujer and Schneider, 1995, Steiner,
2001 and Plaßmann, 2002). Most of these papers are based on the German Socio–Economic Panel
(GSOEP)2 and apply single spell parametric (mixed-)proportional hazard models for the exit
from unemployment.3 The estimated effects of the reform of the unemployment compensation
system mainly point to the direction that longer entitlement periods for unemployment benefits
result in lower re-employment rates and therefore in longer unemployment duration. Hunt (1995)
finds that workers aged 44-48 increased their unemployment duration greatly relative to younger
workers. She also finds that the effect for the 49-57 year-old workers was smaller. Hujer and
Schneider (1996) find that aged 44-48 have significantly smaller hazards for re-employment relative
to the younger workers. Steiner (2001) and Plaßmann (2002) have similar findings for elderly
unemployed. Steiner (2001) concludes that the results are in accordance with one of the main
implications of job-search theory, i.e. unemployment durations increase when entitlement periods
are extended. There are also several contributions with related topics using survey data from
other countries. Empirical studies for the United States suggest a positive effect of the potential
duration and the benefits level on the expected duration of unemployment (Katz and Meyer, 1990,
1For a detailed description of the German unemployment compensation system and of the conducted reforms,
see Hunt (1995) and Plaßmann (2002).
2Only Plaßmann (2002) uses the IAB employment subsample 1975-1995.
3Van den Berg (2001) stresses that the interpretation of the results of single spell (mixed-)proportional hazard
models are often unstable and should be performed with extreme caution.
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and Solon, 1985). Narendranathan, Nickell and Stern (1995) find for Britain a positive elasticity
of expected unemployment duration for men with respect to the level of unemployment benefits.
The effect depends on the age and is smaller for the > 45 years old. They do not find an impact
for the long term unemployed. Van den Berg (1990) obtains positive elasticities using data from
the Netherlands in a non-stationary job search model. The elasticities are greater after two years
of duration time.
This paper pursues a descriptive empirical analysis based on comprehensive German register
data, the IAB employment subsample, which contains panel data for about 500.000 individuals for
West-Germany during the period 1975-1997. We make use of the extreme richness of the data and
we avoid risky parametric models by performing non-parametric estimations which are less likely
subject to misspecification of the functional form. The findings suggest that the strong increases
in maximum benefit entitlement periods for older workers in West-Germany during the 1980s did
not extend the duration until unemployed workers found a new job among those who were still
looking for a new job. The effect was rather to extend the duration of nonemployment effectively
leading the way to early retirement and withdrawal from the labor market.
Concretely, we find the following: The average nonemployment durations for elderly unem-
ployed (>53 years) increased between 1981 and 1993 by 50 percent, whereby the average nonem-
ployment duration of younger unemployed (<42 years) decreased by about 25 percent. For the
other age groups it remained constant. At the same time the average duration of temporary un-
employment remained constant over the period for all age groups. In particular in the business
manufacturing sector the probability for staying in nonemployment has increased for the elderly
to a dramatical level of about 90%. This is probably due to a sharp increase in the use of early
retirement packages. The extension of the maximum entitlement of unemployment insurance has
only a limited influence on the distribution of the length of temporary unemployment durations,
i.e. we do not observe that elderly individuals spend more time in unemployment before they
accept a new job. Moreover, if elderly unemployed accept a new job, they do it on average faster
than their younger colleagues. We also observe that the length of employment spells after a pe-
riod of temporary unemployment did not increase for the age groups with longer entitlements in
comparison. Moreover, the post-unemployment earnings for the aged 42− 65 unemployed did not
increase after the reform relative to the earnings of the aged <42. This indicates that the match-
ing quality between employee and job has not improved after the reforms. We conclude that the
additional expenses by the German federal labor office yield an advantage for two groups: com-
panies, who disband their elderly unemployed using subsidized early retirement packages and the
elderly employees who lost the incentive to look for a new job using the extensive early retirement
packages.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the
institutions. Nonemployment and unemployment–between–jobs are defined in section 3 as two
proxies for unemployment available in the data. Section 4 develops a theoretical model to analyze
differences between the two proxies. Transitions from employment to unemployment are analyzed
empirically in section 5. Section 6 discusses the distribution of unemployment durations and sec-
tion 7 performs the survival analysis. Job stability and wages in employment after unemployment
are analyzed empirically in section 8. Section 9 concludes and the appendix contains further
institutional information and the detailed empirical findings.
2 Data and Institutions
The data used for the analysis is the IAB Employment Subsample (IAB-Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe
1975-1997 [Regionalfile], IABS). A basic description of the data set can be found in Bender et
al. (2000).4 The data contain daily register data of about 500.000 individuals in West-Germany
on their employment spells and the spells during which they receive transfer payments from the
labor offices. It is a representative sample of employment subject to social security taxation and,
therefore, it is not representative with respect to periods of nonemployment. Employment periods
are based on the register records of the public pension funds which obtain from the companies the
relevant information about employment spells subject to social security taxation. Periods of self
employment and employment as life-time civil servants (Beamte) are not included in the data.
Periods of registered unemployment – or economically more meaningful concepts of unemploy-
ment (e.g. according to the ILO standard) – can not be identified from the data. The German
federal labor office has added instead the periods in which the individuals obtain some kind of
income transfer payment. The data records spells involving the following three types of transfer
payments:
1. Unemployment benefits UB (“Arbeitslosengeld”),
2. Unemployment assistance UA (“Arbeitslosenhilfe”), and
3. Income Maintenance during training IMT (“Unterhaltsgeld”). This is paid during partici-
pation in public sponsored training as a part of active labor market policy.
4These data are also used by Plaßmann (2002) to analyze unemployment duration. To sharpen our understand-
ing of the data generating process, one of the authors (R. Wilke) visited some unemployment offices in different
parts of West Germany.
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Our discussion of institutions refers to the setup between 1981 and 1997 which differs from the
situation today.5 The analysis in this paper is restricted to the years 1981 to 1997 because the
information about spells with transfer payments is likely to be incomplete before that time, see
Bender et al. (2000) and the references given there.
The three types of transfer payments differ with respect to the income replacement ratio and as
to whether they are means tested. UB as well as IMT are paid as certain percentage (between 60
and 67%) of past earnings and they are generally not means tested. UA involves a somewhat lower
replacement ratio (between 53 and 58% in the period of consideration) and it is means tested.
Provided that individuals had sufficiently long employment spells before they become unemployed
they are eligible for UB for the maximum entitlement periods depicted in table 1. After the end
of the maximum entitlement periods, they would become eligible for the lower UA only if their
family had no other source of income and no wealth (means tested). Until 1997 also participation
in training did not only provide a source of income through receipt of IMT but it itself did also
renew the entitlement for UB – just as if the unemployed individual had been working.
Unfortunately, the data only involve spell information on the fact whether transfer payments
were received but do not provide the information on the level of these payments. Evidence
reported in Franz (2003, table 7.9) suggests that the actual replacement ratios are typically lower
than the nominal ratios mentioned above. This is mostly due to temporary (6–12 weeks) or
permanent sanctions (“Sperrzeiten”) which are mainly applied for two reasons. First, when an
unemployed worker quits voluntarily, he becomes eligible for UB only after a while. Second,
when an unemployed worker rejects an acceptable job offer, he is punished by losing UB for a
while. The IABS reports these periods of no UB receipt as a late start or as interruption in
the spells of transfer payments. Wilke (2003) provides a descriptive analysis of sanctions in the
IAB-Employment subsample.
In order to reduce the labor supply and “free jobs for young workers”, government policy
allowed receipt of UB as an intermediate step between employment and early retirement. While
being on UB, social security taxes were still paid for unemployed individuals and they were still
accumulating claims on social security payments after retirement. In addition, the discount on
social security payments after early retirement, i.e. before the official retirement age at 65 years,
was actuarially biased in favor of early retirement (see table 1 in Berkel and Bo¨rsch–Supan,
5Also during the time period under consideration a number of changes were enacted in addition to the extension
of the benefit entitlement periods. For instance, the income replacement ratios for UB and UA were reduced in the
case of unemployed individuals without children and increased in the case of unemployed individuals with children,
see Hunt (1995). The income replacement ratio for IMT was above the ratio for UB at the beginning. It was
reduced a number of times so that for most of the time period under consideration it was equal to the ratio for UB.
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2003). Thus, during the mid 1980s receipt of UB was becoming the stepping stone towards early
retirement for workers at an age above 55 years (see Koller et al., 2003, for a recent account of
this). Hunt (1995) finds some evidence for this using survey data (GSOEP) but she does not
analyze this issue in detail.
The data provide no information on spells when an individual is registered as unemployed and
is not entitled to transfer payments from the labor offices as well as whether she receives welfare
payments (“Sozialhilfe”). This is particularly relevant for an analysis of long–term unemployment
which in cases without transfer payments in the data can not be reasonably distinguished from
having left the labor force.
3 Proxies for Unemployment
Since the data does not allow for an economically meaningful, exact assessment as to whether an
individual is unemployed or out of labor force, we use the two extreme benchmarks nonemployment
and unemployment–between–jobs to analyze the changes in the duration of unemployment. The
common definition ”registered unemployment” cannot be used because there is not sufficient
information in the data. The two benchmarks are operationalized as follows:
1. Nonemployment (NE): all periods of nonemployment after an employment period which
contain at least one period with income transfers by the German federal labor office. The
nonemployment period is considered as censored if the last record involves a UB, UA, or
IMT payment that is not followed by an employment spell.6 In this case we do not know
whether the individual is still unemployed, out of labor force or maybe self-employed. With
this definition of unemployment we include the periods of nonemployment (out of the labor
force, social benefits) which are not explicitly recorded in the data. From 1980 to 1997, a
total number of 371.317 nonemployment periods are observed in the IABS.
2. Unemployment between jobs (UBJ): all episodes between two employment spells during
which an individual continuously receives UB, UA, or IMT payments. Interruptions of these
payments can be up to four weeks – in the case of cut–off times: six weeks. With this
definition it is ensured that the individuals are continuously registered as unemployed. Note
that this sample does not include many registered unemployed, in particular long term
unemployed. From 1980 to 1997, a total number of 204.954 UBJ spells are observed in the
IABS.
6A nonemployment spell is treated as right censored if it is not fully observed.
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These two definitions provide benchmarks on the length of unemployment taking account of the
fact that not all unemployed are successful in finding a new job during the period of observation
(therefore the UBJ definition can not be used alone) and of the fact that unemployed individuals
may leave the labor force. In order to proxy for the unemployment period when people eventually
leave the labor force, the NE definition assumes that unemployment ends after the exhaustion of
transfer payment and the only usable information is then that unemployment is right censored at
this point. However, this definition also entails the possibility that individuals might have left the
labor force earlier, i.e. they are not interested in a new job any more, and they just keep receiving
the transfer payments because the labor offices can not sanction this behavior.7 In contrast, the
UBJ definition excludes cases where a job is found some time after the end of the entitlement to
transfer payments. This allows us to focus on the link between benefit entitlement periods and
finding a job. The definition also excludes cases where people leave the labor force after the end
of the entitlement period and later find a job. The next section analyzes the link between the
length of unemployment, NE, and UBJ based on a theoretical model.
4 Determinants of Nonemployment and Unemployment
between Jobs
Ideally, our empirical analysis should investigate the determinants of unemployment. However, we
cannot observe unemployment in the available data (see previous section) and, instead, we analyze
both nonemployment (NE) and unemployment–between–jobs (UBJ) as benchmarks. This section
treats both durations as the outcome of a competing–risks–model in order to discuss the link
between the duration of unemployment and what we actually estimate for NE and UBJ.
4.1 Basic model
The issue of linking the two proxies for unemployment is analyzed by means of the following
competing–risks–model
t = min(tE, tO) (1)
7See Wilke (2003) for an analysis of sanctions when unemployed individuals do not take an acceptable job offer.
This study shows that sanctions to a large extent seem ineffective due to a high withdrawal rate.
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where t is the possibly unobserved unemployment duration,
tE is the time until a new job is taken, and
tO is the time until individual leaves the labor force.
Both definitions NE and UBJ provide possibly censored observations on the duration of unem-
ployment t. NE entails an information loss due to many individuals being right censored and due
to the possibility that individuals who are receiving transfer payments might not be searching for
a job any more. Otherwise NE involves no further restriction on the observability of t thus we
treat in the following t as the length of NE. In contrast, UBJ involves no right censored durations
but this definition conditions the observability of t on the outcome tE < tO.
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How is the economically meaningful concept of unemployment captured in this model and
what are the effects we are looking for in our analysis of unemployment? Incentive effects of
unemployment benefits derived from search theory operate mainly through the job finding duration
tE, which represents the economic concept of unemployment. However, it is conceivable that the
exit rate out of labor force is indirectly affected by changes in unemployment benefits, e.g. when
benefits are extended it is rational to postpone an exit out of labor force. The effects of stronger
incentives for early retirement by elderly workers are just opposite. Such incentives reduce the
duration until the exit out of labor force and, at the same time, they reduce the incentives to search
for a new job, thus increasing tE. What we are looking for in our empirical analysis is evidence for
such differential effects on tE and tO. This evidence can only be indirect since tE and tO are not
directly observed. Instead of estimating a structural competing risks model requiring a number
of modeling assumptions, which are difficult to justify based on first principles, we investigate the
implication of this model on the observable NE and UBJ durations.
For simplicity of the argument, let us assume that both tE and tO are exponentially distributed,
independent random variables with hazard rates λE and λO, respectively. Then, it follows imme-
diately that t is exponentially distributed with hazard rate λ = λE +λO.
9 This links the exit rates
to employment λE and to out–of–labor–force λO with λ as the exit rate of the duration of the NE
spells .
UBJ spells are observed conditional upon tE < tO, thus the following argument links λE and
λO to the duration of the UBJ spells. The probability that an observed UBJ spell is longer than
8In our empirical analysis, UBJ excludes cases where individuals find a job some time after the end of their
benefit entitlement. Therefore, it is to be expected that the distribution function of UBJ according to the definition
in the empirical analysis lies strictly to the left of the one for the definition used in the theoretical model. The main
insights gained from the theoretical model – as to be seen later – will therefore apply a forteriori to the relationship
between the empirical NE and UBJ distributions.
9To see this, note P (t > T ) = P (tE > T ) · P (tO > T ) = exp(−λET ) · exp(−λOT ) = exp[−(λE + λO)T ].
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T is given by10
P (tE > T, tE < tO|tE < tO) = exp[−(λE + λO)T ] .
Therefore, we obtain the possibly surprising result that UBJ and NE spell durations exhibit, in
fact, the same exponential distribution with exit rate λ = λE + λO. Both durations are therefore
affected in the same way by changes in the determinants of the job finding rate λE and the exit
rate from the labor force λO. Let SNE(T ) and SUBJ(T ) be the survival functions of the NE and
the UBJ durations, respectively, and let z be a variable affecting λE and λO, then one obtains
∂SNE(T )
∂z
=
∂SUBJ(T )
∂z
= −T · exp[−(λE + λO)T ]
(
∂λE
∂z
+
∂λO
∂z
)
. (2)
Based on this result, the effects of an increase in unemployment benefits or in incentives for
early retirement is ambiguous both for NE and UBJ durations. It is highly plausible that with
unemployment benefits the effect through tE dominates, i.e. NE and UBJ durations increase
in response to an extension of unemployment benefits, and vice versa with incentives for early
retirement the effect through tO dominates, thus, the introduction of early retirement benefits
reduces both NE and UBJ durations.
The main result in this subsection, namely, that NE and UBJ durations exhibit the same
distribution is neither helpful to assess differential effects on NE and UBJ duration nor to infer
something about the effects on tE and tO durations. The equality of the NE and UBJ distribution
hinges critically on the absence of unobserved heterogeneity, as we will show in the next subsection.
Also a deviation from the assumption of a constant hazard rate for both risks results in differences
between NE and UBJ. The direction of the difference is ambiguous and this is something we will
not base our empirical analysis upon.11 For the clarity of the theoretical argument and because of
the economic plausibility of the importance of unobserved heterogeneity, we stick in the following
to the case of constant hazard rates. Finally, it has to be noted as well that the definition of NE
durations, when individuals do not find a job (see previous section), also entails the possibility
that individuals might have left the labor force earlier than the end of transfer payments. This
effect would result in an upward bias in the observed NE distribution.
10To see this, note P (tE < tO) = λEλE+λO and
P (tE > T, tE < tO) =
∫ ∞
T
∫ ∞
tE
λEexp(−λEtE)λOexp(−λOtO) dtO dtE = λE
λE + λO
· exp[−(λE + λO)T ] .
11Generally speaking, one obtains the intuitive result that the UBJ distribution lies strictly to the left (to the
right) of the NE distribution, if the distribution of te durations lies to the left (to the right) of to durations and the
variance of both distributions is small. The part about the variance is crucial because the result is just reversed
when variances are large. Simulation results of both types for lognormal distributions are available upon request.
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4.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
Our subsequent empirical results show that the survival function of NE durations is larger than
that for UBJ durations for all subgroups considered. As indicated at the end of the last subsection,
this could be the outcome of a particular deviation from the assumption of a constant hazard rate
for both risks. Our focus lies, however, on the fact that unobserved heterogeneity, introduced in
a particular way, is consistent with our empirical findings.
The introduction of unobserved heterogeneity changes the comparison between the NE and
UBJ duration for the case of constant hazard rates, see Van den Berg (2001) for a recent survey
on duration models illustrating the importance of unobserved heterogeneity. We allow here for
the simplest distribution of unobserved heterogeneity just involving two types of workers, i.e. a
mass point distribution with two types.12 Assume for the hazard rates into employment and out
of labor force
λE(α) = λ¯E + α and λO(α) = λ¯O − l · α ,
where α represents the unobserved heterogeneity part, λ¯E and λ¯O are the systematic parts of
the hazard rates, and 0 < l < 1. This specification involves a negative correlation between the
two hazard rates. It is plausible that unobserved characteristics which positively affect the job
finding rate are negatively correlated with the propensity to leave the labor force. Since l < 1, it
is also assumed that the effect on the job finding rate is stronger than on the exit rate from the
labor force. The setup here corresponds to the discussion of differential effects on tE and tO in
the previous subsection. We assume a distribution with two mass points P (α = αj) = pj with
j = 1, 2, p1 + p2 = 1, and α1 > α2, i.e. the α1–type individuals are more likely to find a job and
less likely to leave the labor force compared to the α2–types.
Based on the results above, the survival functions of the NE and the UBJ durations for the
different α–types is given by
SNE(T |α) = SUBJ(T |α) = exp{−[λ¯E + λ¯O + (1− l)α]T} .
However, this does not imply that the distributions of the observed durations for which α is
integrated out are also the same. In fact, it is now shown that the survival function of NE duration
lies strictly to the right of the survival function of UBJ durations, i.e. SNE(T ) > SUBJ(T ) for all
T . Therefore, UBJ spells seem to end quicker than NE spells in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity.
12Differences in observed characteristics can be dealt with in standard ways by stratifying the data according to
the observed characteristics (or using regression type methods). The equality of the two distributions then holds
within each stratum.
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To show this, note that for NE durations by the law of iterated expectations
SNE(T ) =
2∑
j=1
pjexp{−[λ¯E + λ¯O + (1− l)αj]T} .
To analyze the survival function for UBJ durations, note that
SUBJ(T ) = P (tE > T |tE < tO) = P (tE > T, tE < tO)
P (tE < tO)
.
For the two probabilities in the last expression, one obtains (see footnote 10)
P (tE < tO) =
2∑
j=1
pj
λ¯E + αj
λ¯E + λ¯O + (1− l)αj
and
P (tE > T, tE < tO) =
2∑
j=1
pj
λ¯E + αj
λ¯E + λ¯O + (1− l)αj
exp{−[λ¯E + λ¯O + (1− l)αj]T} .
Hence,
SUBJ(T ) =
2∑
j=1
p˜jexp{−[λ¯E + λ¯O + (1− l)αj]T} ,
with “adjusted weights”
p˜j =
pj
λ¯E+αj
λ¯E+λ¯O+(1−l)αj∑2
k=1 pk
λ¯E+αk
λ¯E+λ¯O+(1−l)αk
for j = 1, 2.
Since α1 > α2, it follows that p˜1 > p1 and p˜2 < p2
13 and, therefore, SUBJ(T ) < SNE(T ). From
this result we can easily infer that an increase in the dispersion of α1 and α2 for given weights pj
with j = 1, 2 results in a larger difference between SUBJ(T ) and SNE(T ).
This result can be motivated as follows. Since we assume some form of unobserved hetero-
geneity which affects UBJ durations more strongly than NE duration, the quicker exits of the
α1–types to employment results in the UBJ population having a larger share of α1–types than
the population of all individuals corresponding to the NE population. Therefore, on average the
individuals in the UBJ population exhibit shorter durations which is captured by the adjusted
weights p˜j.
13This result follows from the simple fact that
1−x
a−x(1−l)
1+y
a+y(1−l)
< 1
for a > 1, x, y > 0, l > 0, provided that the expressions 1− x, a− x(1− l), and a + y(1− l) are strictly positive.
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To finish this subsection, how does the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity change the
comparative statics for the observed NE and UBJ survival functions. It is clear, that for NE
durations ∂SNE(T )
∂z
is just a weighted average of expressions as in equation (2) where the weights
are the probabilities pj. For UBJ duration,
∂SUBJ (T )
∂z
also involves the effect of a change in z on
the adjusted weights p˜j. It is therefore not possible to sign unambiguously the difference between
the changes in the two durations. For instance, a reduction in job finding rates λ¯E can possibly
result in a stronger increase of NE durations compared to UBJ durations.
4.3 Simulation results
Anticipating our major empirical finding, for older individuals NE durations but not UBJ durations
have became relatively longer compared to younger individuals between the 1980s and 1990s. How
can this finding be rationalized within our model setup in light of the policy changes discussed in
the introduction? This subsection illustrates a plausible mechanism by means of a simulation of
our model.
For the simulation, we assume that there exist two subgroups of workers, the treatment group
(the older workers) and the control group (the younger workers).14 These two groups can be
identified in the data. We make the economically plausible assumption that for the treatment
group, the job finding rates are lower and the exit rates out of the labor force are larger compared
to the control group, i.e. the specific hazard rates used for the simulation are given by
λE = 0.3 + α(TREAT ) and λO = 0.2− 0.4 · α(TREAT )
and TREAT = 1 for the treatment group and TREAT = 0 for the control group. Further, an
individual belongs with probability 0.5 to either the treatment or the control group. Concretely,
we assume
α(TREAT ) =
{
α1 = 0 with probability p1 = 0.5 irrespective of treatment status
α2(TREAT ) with probability p2 = 0.5
where α2(0) = −0.1 and α2(1) = −0.14. For the α2–types in the treatment group, the policy
change increases the propensity to leave the labor force and it decreases the job finding rate.
There is no change for the control group as well as for the α1–types in the treatment group. Also,
the share of α2–types does not change in either group.
14These labels are motivated by the fact that older workers were affected by various policy changes. Both
incentives for early retirement and unemployment benefit entitlement periods did increase strongly over time for
this group.
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This setup is motivated by the following interpretation of the actual policy changes in Germany.
For older individuals, the combination of an extension of unemployment benefits and an increase
of incentives for early retirement did strongly increase the propensity to leave the labor force
and reduce the job finding rate for the subgroup of individuals characterized by low labor force
attachment (“α2–types”). In contrast, older individuals with a high labor force attachment (“α1–
types”) were barely affected by these changes.
We simulate the above model for a random sample of 400,000 observations to obtain a good
estimate of the survival functions implied by the model. The results are depicted in figure 1. The
first two graphs provide the survival functions of NE and UBJ durations both for the treatment
and the control group before and after the simulated policy change, respectively. Before the policy
change, the NE survival curve is strictly to the right of the UBJ survival curve for both groups but
for the control group this difference is not visible. After the change, the difference between NE and
UBJ is larger for the treatment group. This is to be expected since the dispersion of the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution increases. The third graph shows that the NE survival function for the
treatment group moves strictly to the right. In contrast, and possibly surprising at first glance,
the UBJ survival function moves strictly to the left for the most part of the distribution and the
change is strongest in the upper part of the distribution. Thus, our modelling setup implies an
increase in NE durations and no increase (in fact a decline) in UBJ durations even though the job
finding rates decline for a subgroup of workers.
The substance of our result, namely that NE durations increase more strongly than UBJ du-
rations, does not change when we allow the share of α2–types to increase (this is likely to occur
since older individuals might increasingly become unemployed due to stronger early retirement
incentives) and when the job finding rate also declines for the α1–types due to the longer benefit
entitlement periods (the latter effect is likely to be small since the vast majority of UBJ dura-
tions are considerably shorter than the longer benefit entitlement periods). We investigated the
sensitivity of the results by further simulations which are available upon request.
5 Transitions from employment to unemployment
Elderly workers in West-Germany enjoy substantial employment protection in the period under
investigation. It is very difficult to lay off elderly employees once they have a certain tenure.
The risk of unemployment for this group of individuals should therefore be quite low. It is also
important to mention that there is a pool of elderly unemployed (currently aged 58 or above)
who receive unemployment benefits – irrespective of their entitlement based on their employment
history – if they commit not to search for a new job. Elderly unemployed therefore have the option
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to receive unemployment benefits until they are entitled for transfers from the pensions system
and during this period they are not counted as unemployed in the official statistics.
Figure 2 presents the average risk of unemployment for 40-62 aged employees for the two
definitions of unemployment in selected years with rather different macroeconomic environments.15
It becomes apparent that the risk of UBJ is almost independent of the age of the unemployed
and of the year, whereas the risk of nonemployment varies sharply. First, it is observed that the
risk of nonemployment has a peak between age 55 and 59. In 1981, the peak is only evident for
age 59. In 1985 and 1990 the magnitude of the peak reduces but the dispersion increases and it
shifts to the left. The shift to the left and the increased dispersion are due to the extension of the
unemployment insurance payment. This is because even workers who loose their job at age 55 after
the reform are able to reach the critical age limit 58 without interruption of unemployment benefits
transfers. In 1995, the magnitude of the peak sharply increases. This is due to recession in the
mid 1990s. Moreover, the 55-60 aged employees exhibit uniformly higher risks of nonemployment.
The risk of nonemployment is in particular high in the manufacturing sector and even in the public
sector the risk of nonemployment increased in the 1990s (see figure 3).
The different results for the two definitions of unemployment suggest that in particular, in bad
economic environments unemployment benefits are used as an integral part in early retirement
packages. Due to the reform of the maximum entitlement period, the peak of the NE risk shifted
to the left, i.e. the early retirement is offered to the employees several years earlier. Moreover,
since the reform the ratio of the UBJ risk relative to the NE risk decreased in particular for the
elderly (see figure 4). For the age group > 53, this ratio decreased by 50% from 1985 until 1995,
whereas the decrease for the other age groups (apart from the group 49-53) is in the range of 15%.
This shows that even in the years with a good macro economic environment (1985, 1990) the
overall ratio of employees aged >53 entering UBJ given that they enter NE has decreased after
the reform.
6 Distribution of unemployment duration
For the unemployment durations starting in 1981 and 1994, the histograms in figure 5 present the
empirical distributions over the first three years (≈ 1.095 calender days). The upper panel shows
the nonemployment (NE) spells and the lower panel the unemployment between jobs (UBJ) spells.
The censored observations are included in the distribution of NE durations. It is important to
note that there are small mass points at 12 months (1981 and 1994) and 32 months (1994) in the
15See Wilke (2004) for a more detailed analysis of the impact of changing macro conditions on the risk of
unemployment for the 26-41 aged workforce.
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distribution of NE spells. These mass points are directly related to the maximum UB entitlements
periods: a considerable number of NE spells are censored at the end of the UB entitlement period.
Interestingly, mass points at these durations are not observed for UBJ spells. This suggests that
job searchers usually do not wait until the exhaustion of their UB entitlement period before they
accept a new job.
Figure 6 presents the average unemployment durations for the age groups of table 1 from 1981
to 1993. It is evident that average NE duration for > 53 years old unemployed has increased by
50% over this period whereas the average NE duration for the < 42 years old declined by 25%. For
the other age groups, the average NE duration declined during the 1980s and sharply increased
after the German reunification in the 1990s. This is most likely due to macroeconomic changes.
Considering the average UBJ durations, one observes the same variation due to the business cycle
but, at the same time, the older unemployed (> 53 years) leave unemployment faster on average
than all other age groups. This property does not change over time and is therefore not affected
by the reforms under consideration. Note that figures for the years after 1993 are not reported
due to the censoring of the data at the end of 1997.
Table 2 reports the observed number of unemployment spells for the different age groups. Most
noticeable is the sharp increase of the NE spells for the age group > 53 years, i.e. the inflows into
NE spells but not into UBJ spells have increased strongly over time. This is also in accordance
with the findings of the foregoing section.
7 Survival analysis
This section presents estimates of survival functions, which report the probability of remaining in
NE and in UBJ, respectively, after a given duration. The Kaplan-Meier-estimator takes account
of the inherent censoring for NE durations. An upward movement of the survival functions means
that the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased.16
The following figures present selected representative survival function estimates for the 1980s
and 1990s (until 1995) for the age groups considered. Figure 7 (left, upper panel) shows that
the NE survival function did not change much for the < 42 years old. The estimated survival
curves are higher for bad years (1981,1995: bad in the sense of the labor market conditions) and
lower for good (see above) years (1985, 1990). For the age groups 42-43 and 44-48 we observe
similar changes apart from that survival functions increase in the labor market slowdown of the
mid 1990s (figure 7, left, middle and bottom). For the age group 49-53 the increase in the mid
16A detailed Kaplan-Meier unemployment survival analysis of the West-German 26-41 aged workforce can be
found in Wilke (2004).
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1990s is sharper (figure 8, left, up). Considering the age group > 53, it is apparent that the NE
survival functions continuously increased over the 15 years under consideration and they did so
even in the boom year after the reunification (figure 8, left, bottom). Interestingly, at the same
time, the UBJ survival curves of the elderly (> 53 years) remained almost constant(!) (figure 8,
right, bottom). We observe similar patterns for the other age groups and the survival curves in
the mid 1990s increased a bit for all groups including even the younger unemployed. It is not
evident from these results that the increase is due to the reform between 1985-1987. It seems to
be caused by a structural change due to the bad macroeconomic environment. Since the increase
of the UBJ survival functions is a bit greater for the aged 42-53 than for the young unemployed
it might be the case that the reform shows an effect in a weak macroeconomic situation only.
Surprisingly, as explained by our theoretical model, we do not observe this for the > 53 aged.
Figure 9 shows that the survival curves vary sharply over the sector of last employment before
entering unemployment. For the manufacturing sectors17, the survival curves for the age group
> 53 increased up to more than 0.9 after three years (figure 9, up, left), while this probability is
only about 0.6 for the other sectors 18 (figure 9, bottom, left). The sharp increase of the survival
functions, in particular in the manufacturing sector, is probably directly related to the massive
early retirement programs which were conducted at this time. Considering the survival functions
of those in UBJ (figure 9, right), it is obvious that the survival curves remained almost constant
over time with some increase in the manufacturing sector in the mid 1990s.
Considering the empirical survival functions for the age group > 53 years in figure 10, the
effect of the reform on the observed length of NE becomes apparent immediately. The jumps
at the maximum length of UB entitlements are shifted to the right after the reform. This shift
is particularly obvious for the manufacturing sectors,19 where the empirical survival function is
shifted about 20 months to the right. The jumps for NE (being absent for UBJ) reflect that many
observed spells end at the the maximum entitlement periods and are thus due to the administrative
rules. It follows that many elderly nonemployed then drop out of the labor force or they are not
eligible for further unemployment benefits. From figure 8 (right, bottom) it was already apparent
that most of them did not re-enter into regular employment.
17Production of durables, consumption goods and base materials.
18Agriculture, energy, mining, nutrition, construction, traffic, communication, services, public sector, with trade
excluded.
19During the period 1985 to 1987 the maximum length of entitlements was increased step by step from 12 to 32
months. This pattern is clearly visible in figure 10 (left).
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8 Employment stability and wages after unemployment
Employment periods after unemployment could possibly be affected by the policy change. This
can be assessed by analyzing the length of the following employment spells (employment stability)
and the changes in earnings after unemployment compared to before unemployment. Figure 11
reports the median20 of the length of employment spells after UBJ. A change for the elderly relative
to the younger unemployed over time might be an indication that more generous financial support
may result in a better match of employee and job and therefore higher employment stability.
This is not found empirically since the elderly do not improve over time compared to the younger
unemployed. It is also apparent that the median is highest for 1988 because employment stability
was highest during the reunification boom with low unemployment rates during the time period
1990 to 1992.
Another important proxy for the quality of the subsequent match is the wage. Denote wp as
the wage of the unemployed in the previous employment and denote wf as the wage in the future
employment. In the following, let us consider the transition from the position of wp in the wage
distribution (F ) in the year when the unemployment spell begins (t1) to the position of wf in F in
the year when the unemployment spell ends (t2). Denote ∆Ft1 = Ft2(wf )−Ft1(wp) as the change
in the position in the wage distribution. ∆Ft has an intuitive meaning: it is negative (positive)
if the future wage is in a lower (higher) position in the population wage distribution than the
previous wage. An extension of the maximum entitlements period should allow the unemployed
to spend more time in waiting for the same job offer compared to an individual without extended
entitlements. This should increase the expected ∆Ft for the treated individuals and therefore
result in a shift of the distribution of ∆Ft to the right.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for ∆Ft for the full time employees in the different
age groups. It is evident that the distributions for the age groups are almost time invariant.21
The increase of the maximum entitlement period is not associated with a shift of the distributions
for the treated individuals to the right. The changes in the distributions are mainly due to the
business cycle. Surprisingly, between 50 − 60% of the considered group of unemployed reach
after the unemployment period a higher position in the wage distribution compared to before
unemployment.
Another way to assess the impact of the reform on future earnings is to use a difference–in–
differences method by including age dummies in a regression model. The following Tobit regression
20The median is chosen because many long employment spells are censored at the data end of 1997. This affects
in particular the average values in the 1990ties.
21Nonparametric density estimates of the distributions are also time invariant over 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1994.
17
model is estimated:
log(w∗f ) = α + β
′x1 + γ′1Iage group, year + δ′x2 + ,
where w∗f = min{wf , c}, x1 is a vector of exogenous observable variables, and x2 is a vector of
variables which control for the unobserved heterogeneity (such as the wage wp in the previous job,
the duration of unemployment, and unemployment experience). 1Iage group, year is a 14× 1 dummy
vector for the age groups, the calender years and the cross terms, i.e. the treatment effects (see
table 4 for details). We choose the untreated individuals (aged <42) and the year before the
reform (1981) as reference category.  is the error term. The censoring of the wage distribution
from above (c is the topcoding value) is due to the upper threshold for social security taxation
above which wages are not reported. Two models are estimated: one basic model, where the error
term is in fact the convolution of  and the unobserved heterogeneity, and one model that controls
for x2 as proxying unobserved heterogeneity. From the results in table 4 it is not apparent that
the reform of the maximum entitlements periods had an effect on the earnings of the elderly, since
none of the estimated coefficients for the treatment effects are significantly positive and just one
of the significant coefficients indicate a positive treatment effect (age 44-48 in 1985). These results
are in contrast to Gangl (2002) who finds based on the German Socioeconomic Panel that more
generous payments of unemployment benefits weakens the negative effect of unemployment on the
quality of employment after unemployment.
9 Conclusions
This paper provides a descriptive analysis of the duration of nonemployment and unemployment
between jobs before and after the changes during the mid 1980s in the maximum entitlement period
for unemployment benefits for older workers. The analysis develops a theoretical framework in
order to interpret differences between nonemployment and unemployment between jobs. The
most striking result is that the average duration of nonemployment for elderly unemployed has
increased sharply after the reform under consideration whereas the duration of unemployment
between jobs does not seem to be affected. This is probably because unemployment benefits were
used as an integral part of early retirement packages. Due to the reform, the companies - and even
the public sector - obtained a convenient instrument in order to disband elderly employees with
the help of social compensation plans. Since the elderly employees did approve of such generous
retirement packages, they didn’t insist on their dismissal protection. This is a typical win–win
situation on the expense of the general public. An increase in the usage of early retirement is
also strongly suggested both by the increase in the inflows of elderly workers into nonemployment,
18
especially in the economic recession after the reform, compared to the fact that inflows of the
elderly into unemployment between jobs did not rise after the reform. The results emphasize that
it is indispensable to distinguish between the flows out of labor force and the flows back into
employment among the elderly (>53 years) unemployed.
One surprising aspect of our descriptive results is the fact that the duration of unemployment
between jobs among the elderly did not seem to change after the reform, i.e. the duration of
unemployment between jobs did not increase for this group, which is in contrast to the findings
of Hunt (1995) and others in the literature. In fact, the behavior of the unemployed who are
willing to accept a new job before and after the reform does not seem to be affected by the reform
considered here. Our results also suggest that the varying macroeconomic environment may affect
the job search behavior for the considered age groups in a different manner. It is not possible
to infer from this paper how many unemployed were induced not to accept a new job at all due
to the reform. Finally, our results suggest that extended benefit entitlements for unemployed do
not result in a better job match resulting in employment job stability or higher earnings. Further
research using more structural methods will be useful to assess whether our descriptive results are
robust.
Appendix: tables and figures
Table 1: Maximum entitlements for unemployment benefits (UB) before and after the
reform (in months).
Age group until December 1984 January 1985 - January 1986- from July 1987
December 1985 December 1987
<42 12 12 12 12
42-43 12 12 12 18
44-48 12 12 16 22
49-53 12 18 20 26
>53 12 18 24 32
Source: Bundesgesetzblatt 1983–1988, Hunt (1995)
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Table 2: Number of observed unemployment durations starting in the respective
year
Age group 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
Nonemployment (NE)
<42 16.281 16.401 16.262 15.738 13.115 12.848 16.144 14.810
42-43 839 792 640 503 500 547 776 746
43-48 1.551 1.915 1.875 1.623 1.235 1.141 1.578 1.613
49-53 1.112 1.256 1.382 1.526 1.292 1.400 1.755 1.332
>53 1.826 1.906 1.846 1.900 1.709 2.117 3.168 3.033
Unemployment between Jobs (UBJ)
<42 9.493 9.677 10.544 9.989 8.134 7.185 9.241 8.093
42-43 538 498 435 333 330 326 420 392
43-48 993 1.195 1.299 1.098 780 640 867 875
49-53 619 723 938 934 841 785 822 595
>53 672 715 816 710 579 582 684 672
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the computed ∆Ft(w): average values, sample variances
in brackets and the percentage of observations with positive value.
Age group 1981 1985 1990 1994
<42 0.0295 (0.0362) 0.0369 (0.0348) 0.0415 (0.0362) 0.0198 (0.0345)
> 0 59% 61% 61% 57%
42-43 −0.0019 (0.0285) −0.0137 (0.0344) −0.0017 (0.0347) −0.0153 (0.0393)
> 0 54% 51% 54% 50%
44-48 −0.0083 (0.0293) −0.0088 (0.0340) −0.0006 (0.0350) −0.0238 (0.0384)
> 0 54% 53% 53% 47%
49-53 −0.0032 (0.0270) −0.0244 (0.0301) 0.0080 (0.0275) −0.0364 (0.0397)
> 0 55% 50% 57% 48%
>53 −0.0025 (0.0286) −0.0184 (0.0268) 0.0125 (0.0230) −0.0067 (0.0347)
> 0 57% 48% 59% 55%
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Table 4: Results of Tobit regression of wage in new job after unemployment.
basic model unobserved heterogeneity
variable t-value t-value
const 4.1650∗ 667.8544 2.7641∗ 123.5678
female −0.2701∗ -51.2730 −0.1507∗ -29.3110
married 0.1477∗ 29.9222 0.0630∗ 14.0086
female * married −0.1768∗ -20.8681 −0.1493∗ -19.5119
citizenship −0.0342∗ -5.0147 −0.0436∗ -7.0584
skilled 0.1556∗ 37.5522 0.0400∗ 10.3488
university degree 0.4897∗ 36.0653 0.2518∗ 19.9314
log(wp) - 0.3594
∗ 69.1368
wp left-censored - 1.1017
∗ 41.9865
wp right-censored - 1.9586
∗ 64.7698
length of unemployment spell - −0.0000∗ -4.3668
recently unemployed before - −0.0490∗ -12.5614
previously recalled - 0.0674∗ 13.9588
age group 42-43 0.0966∗ 5.4078 0.0316∗ 1.9601
age group 44-48 0.0566∗ 4.1460 0.0071 0.5746
age group 49-53 0.0374∗ 2.2172 −0.0076 -0.5048
age group >53 0.0614∗ 3.8126 0.0013 0.0904
age group 42-43 × 1985 -0.0215 -0.8038 −0.0281 -1.1647
age group 44-48 × 1985 0.0354∗ 1.9736 0.0115 0.7095
age group 49-53 × 1985 0.0357 1.6648 0.0036 0.1882
age group 42-43 × 1990-1994 −0.0810∗ -3.2872 −0.0639∗ -2.8703
age group 44-48 × 1990-1994 0.0156 0.8739 0.0061 0.3799
age group 49-53 × 1990-1994 0.0328 1.6122 0.0183 1.0050
age group >53 × 1985-1994 0.0035 0.1861 −0.0043 -0.2536
1985 0.1083∗ 18.5624 0.0791∗ 15.2591
1990 0.2880∗ 45.4523 0.1909∗ 33.7011
1994 0.4030∗ 65.4637 0.2517∗ 44.5560
σ2 0.1302 0.1066
Log-likelihood −15218.172 −11582.154
Nobs, Nvars 37438, 21 37438, 27
# of censored 171 171
*: significant at the 5% level 22
Figure 1: Simulation Results regarding survival functions of NE and UBJ durations
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Figure 2: Average risk of unemployment as a function of the age
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Figure 3: Average risk of nonemployment in selected business sectors
19811983198519871989199119931995
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
year
<42
42−43
44−48
49−53
>53
Figure 4: Average risk of unemployment between jobs given nonemployment
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Figure 5: Histogramm of the length of observed unemployment durations in 1981 and 1994.
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Figure 6: Evolution of average unemployment durations in days over the years under consideration
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Figure 7: Kaplan-Meier-survival function estimates
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Figure 8: Kaplan-Meier-survival function estimates
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Figure 9: Kaplan-Meier-survival function estimates stratified by business sectors
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Figure 10: Empirical survival function estimates for age group > 53 years stratified by business
sector
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Figure 11: Median of employment spells after UBJ in days for respective years (left), unemploy-
ment rates for West-Germany (right)
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